It has been nearly sixty years since Franklin Roosevelt captured the U.S. presidency. In the years following his inauguration, FDR oversaw a great many changes in American politics. One of the more important changes during his reign was the emergence of the New Deal Party System. Out of the turmoil of the Great Depression and FDR's response to that calamity, the Democrats emerged as the majority party for the first time since the Civil War. The rise of the Democrats as the dominant force in national politics can be attributed, in part at least, to a set of issues that one might label "New Deal." By 1936, the Democrats were arguing, among other things, that the federal government should protect "the family and home," establish "opportunity for all the people," and aid "those overtaken by disaster." The Republicans, in contrast, opposed such action, preferring instead to rely on "the character and virtue, self-reliance, industry and thrift of the people," not "on the wisdom and power of the government."' These different approaches to solving the problems of the Great Depression were instrumental in the birth of the nation's fifth party system.2
Deal issues since the 1950s, but the durability of these concerns is impressive. These findings do not necessarily mean that the New Deal Party System is alive and well. Clearly, the shifts in the coalitions of the parties and the recent inability of the Democrats to capture the White House indicate that important partisan change has unfolded over the last four decades. But the fact that New Deal issues continue to structure the partisan debate suggests, at minimum, that significant parts of the political agenda set in motion in the 1930s remain intact.
To accept these various conclusions, however, one must find my definition of New Deal issues reasonable, believe that the NES's open-ended questions about the parties and the candidates accurately reflect the partisan concerns of the electorate, and believe that the method of analyzing these data is valid.
NEW DEAL ISSUES
My argument hinges, in large part, on a particular conception of what issues can be thought of as "New Deal." Disagreement over this definition will arise, since there are many ways to view New Deal issues. One might, for instance, argue that the debate over using the federal government to solve the economic ills of the nation is the issue that best symbolizes the New Deal. That view, of course, has merit. But the actual partisan disputes stemming from the New Deal often dealt with much more specific issues than just government intervention. Matters like agricultural policy, banking, and social security were all part of the vast array of concerns emerging from that turbulent era. Consequently, I shall treat New Deal issues in a way that emphasizes these narrower concerns.
The immediate question, of course, becomes: What issues constitute the New Deal? In a recent article, Stanley Kelley offers a useful definition that emphasizes these narrower concerns:
In the New Deal era, controversy swirled about a particular set of conditions, policies, interests, and ideological themes. As one would expect in a party system born in the Great Depression, economic conditions-employment, wage levels, the cost of living, the goodness or badness of the times-were in the foreground of political debate. So were certain areas of policy, among them monetary and fiscal policy, agricultural and labor policy, social security and other welfare programs, housing, power, education and health care. The era saw a politicizing of the interests of labor unions, farmers, the aged, the poor, and its rhetoric pitted the interests of "the common man," or working people, against those of big business, industry, and Wall Street. Ideological discourse put left and right, liberalism and conservatism, and radicalism and reaction in opposition to each other and made tests of right thinking out of orientations toward big government, states' rights, planning, governmental action to improve social conditions, and control (or interference with) private enterprise. (1988, p. 190) These topics, ranging from labor policy to worries about big business, will be treated as New Deal issues.
While this definition has appeal, a number of criticisms may arise. To start, one may question whether this particular set of issues accurately reflects the New Deal. There is no way to satisfy everyone's view on this matter, but this definition should at least be seen as reasonable. For instance, if one examines the 1936 Democratic and Republican platforms, one will find that every topic I define as a New Deal issue was mentioned in some fashion in those documents. These two platforms provide some clue about the value of this definition, since they were the first official response by the national parties to the multitude of legislation that emerged between 1933 and 1935.
A second possible objection is that this definition includes "too many" issues. A quick count of the issues mentioned yields over thirty different concerns. While many issues do fall under this wide umbrella, it is not clear that there are "too many." If one considers the numerous topics in a presidential campaign, New Deal issues, as defined here, comprise just a subset of these topics. For instance, matters surrounding the international arena are absent from this definition. Racial problems, crime, drugs, urban decay, and abortion also fall outside its purview. In political campaigns the candidates' personalities play a big role, yet these matters are not treated as New Deal issues.4
Another related criticism of this definition might be that some of the issues included should not be considered "New Deal." One might, for instance, argue that concerns about fiscal policy, unemployment, or inflation were probably important to citizens before the New Deal and thus are independent of it. This argument has merit if one thinks that New Deal issues should be unique to that era. But there is little reason to adopt such a position. Consider, for instance, that the alignment of the 1890s was built in large part on the economic issues surrounding the dispute over free silver and the recession of 1893. The alignment of the 1930s was also built in part around economic issues, but those concerns stemmed from efforts to overcome the Great Depression. In all likelihood, then, matters pertaining to fiscal policy or unemployment would be part of each alignment, making it reasonable to include such concerns in one's conception of both "New Deal" and "free silver" issues. Sundquist offers support for this position, arguing that in "every new alignment of the party system . . . there will be large, perhaps dominant, elements carried over from the old" (1983, p. 17).
THE EVIDENCE
To chart changes in the public's assessment of New Deal issues, I shall rely on the NES's open-ended questions that ask respondents to state in their own words what they like and dislike about the two parties and the two presidential nominees.5 The NES provides up to five answers per respondent for each of these eight questions, allowing potentially for forty comments.6 Individuals rarely make forty comments. But they do average about eight comments each, providing a rich source of information.
These questions were first asked in 1952 and have been worded the same since then, creating an excellent opportunity to trace changes in the public's attitudes over a thirty-six-year time frame. This long-time series is particularly useful when assessing the importance and influence of the New Deal issues. While scholars disagree over the current status of the New Deal Party System, most believe it was in force during the 1950s and early 1960s. Thus, the results from the presidential elections of 1952, 1956, and 1960 provide a good benchmark from which to judge the public's response to New Deal concerns in the 1970s and 1980s.7
Another asset of the like-dislike questions is that they are open-ended. This format allows respondents to describe parties and candidates in their own words, increasing the likelihood that these individuals mention concerns that are important to them (RePass, 1971; Kelley, 1983) .' This aspect of the data is critical, since an issue must be salient to citizens before it can realign their partisan attitudes (Sundquist, 1983; Carmines and Stimson, 1984) .
METHOD
At this point, we have the data and a definition of what issues qualify as "New Deal." The next task is to devise a way to detect changes in the importance and partisan influence of these issues over the last forty years. There are a number of possible approaches. For this paper, I shall build upon Kelley's (1983) scheme of"interpreting elections." The modifications I introduce seek to adapt that approach to the study of partisan change.
To assess the importance of New Deal issues, I shall rely on two different measures. The first measure Kelley (1983) This measure, however, only tells part of the story. If, for instance, an issue heavily favors one party (i.e., a large bias) yet is salient to only a handful of people, that issue will lack the power to forge significant partisan change among the entire electorate. Similarly, a highly salient issue that favors neither party (i.e., a bias of 50%) would also be unable to alter the net partisan evaluation of the electorate. To generate significant partisan change (e.g., the New Deal Party System), therefore, an issue must be highly salient (e.g., the Great Depression) and must heavily favor one party (e.g., the Democrats). What we need, in other words, is to combine salience with bias.
To do so, I want to introduce the concept of net pull: the relative ability of the two parties to attract supporters on a given issue." The central idea here is that as an issue pulls some citizens to one party, it pushes others to the opposing side. So, for instance, while FDR's New Deal apparently brought many people into the Democratic fold, his stand on governmental activism surely drove others into the Republican camp. Thus, we need to assess the ability of each party to attract supporters on the basis of an issue and then compare those totals to get an estimate of the overall gain (or loss) for one party or the other. The formula I propose is as follows: net pull = salience of an issue x (Democratic bias on that issueRepublican bias on that issue)
One way to think of net pull is the lead a particular party holds over the other on a specific issue (or set of related issues). If that lead shrinks or grows, the result provides a useful estimate of partisan change. There is one final methodological task. Since we are interested in tracing partisan change over time, we need a way to summarize any trends that appear in the data. In an attempt to provide a systematic reading of these partisan shifts, I shall regress the election year on each of these proportions. I am not suggesting that time has caused the changes in these numbers; rather, I am providing a way to measure change over time. Without estimating the slopes and the standard errors, one must just "eyeball" the data. Norpoth and Rusk adopt a similar approach, arguing that it captures "more accurately the extent of change over time" (1982, p. 528). Table 1 The answers to the open-ended questions concerning parties suggest that a shift away from the agenda of the New Deal may be underway (or has taken place). When assessing the importance of New Deal issues, however, it is also important to look at the extent to which these concerns are associated with the nominees of the parties. As Wattenberg (1990) has carefully demonstrated, the public over the last thirty-six years has come to tie issues more closely to candidates than to parties. Thus, by using data generated by comparable questions on presidential candidates, one should be able to assess more fully the importance of New Deal issues to the American public. Note that slopes and standard errors for this table and all subsequent ones are rounded off to the first decimal place. Also, since the time series involves just ten elections, the slopes have to be larger than just twice the size of the standard error to make the .05 cutoff.
THE RESULTS
Note that to calculate the means and the regression estimates I used proportions rounded off to one decimal place. In the table, however, I have rounded up to whole numbers for the actual cell entries. This procedure is followed for all tables.
"Statistically significant at the .01 level.
The data from the public's evaluation of candidates tell a far different story from that of the electorate's assessment of parties: Namely, the importance of New Deal issues has increased since the 1950s. With regard to New Deal comments about candidates, both salience and density have risen over the thirty-six-year period. In 1956, about 27 percent of the electorate found New Deal matters salient when assessing the nominees. By 1984, the proportion soared to 68 percent. The surge in 1984 was unusual, but compared to the rest of the 1980s, or even the 1970s, candidates are still being judged more for their stands on New Deal issues than they were in the 1950s. The slope for salience confirms this observation, showing that, on average, there has been a 3 to 4 percent increase per election since 1952. In the case of density, the rise has been about threefold since the 1950s. 13 This finding is important and interesting, since it is at odds with most of the previous work in this area. It would be problematic to argue, however, that these data about the candidates suggest that the New Deal is stronger in the 1980s than in the 1950s, especially given the results from the first two columns in Table 1 (not to mention the evidence presented by other political scientists). Nonetheless, the obvious question becomes which set of findings should one emphasize? Fortunately, the issue is not whether one set is "better" than the other in assessing partisan change. In point of fact, the best course is to combine both sets of questions into a single estimate of citizens' "partisan" calculations.
This choice stems, in part, from an underlying conception on a party system. It seems reasonable to believe that party systems structure not only how citizens evaluate parties but how they judge the candidates of those parties. If true, then candidates in the 1890s, for instance, would have been judged, in part, on the basis of their views on free silver. Similarly, the issue of slavery would have been an integral part of the electorate's assessment of presidential candidates in the 1850s. While we cannot be sure, such scenarios seem likely. In more recent times, the issue of social security illustrates quite well this point. To some degree, support of this program, a cornerstone of the New Deal, has served as a litmus test for presidential candidates since the 1930s. Nominees of the major parties have needed to show support for it or face electoral trouble, as Barry Goldwater might attest. Even Ronald Reagan, a frequent critic of social security in the 1970s, changed his stance on this issue for the 1980 campaign. He knew that if he did not support this safety net for the less fortunate, there could be serious electoral consequences (Drew, 1981 , pp. 298, 308). Such behavior underscores the connection between the candidates and the central issues of the party system. Thus, while looking at the comments about the parties and candidates separately is instructive, it is also important to examine the combined role of New Deal comments when assessing the "partisan" evaluations of citizens.
A second and related reason for this choice is that even though each question asks explicitly about parties or candidates, there may be some conceptual slippage. That is, one cannot treat the nominees as completely distinct from the parties. Ronald Reagan, for instance, is now tied closely to how people think of the GOP (Grand Old Party). In the 1930s, FDR's flamboyant style surely became part of citizens' assessments of the Democrats. The recent efforts by the GOP to label the Democrats as the party of Jimmy Carter lends further support to this point. In short, candidates often help define the parties, just as the parties help define the candidates.14 The last two columns in Table 1 Tables 1 and 2 offers a host of interesting findings. To begin, the Democrats, despite recent gains by the Republicans, remain the favored party. Of course, one could argue that the trend favoring the GOP suggests that we are in the middle of a shift that will lead them to majority status. While possible, it is simply too early to tell. Perhaps an even more interesting finding is the differential trend in salience among the questions for parties and candidates. This result, at minimum, suggests that previous work that has focused solely on the public's assessments of the parties when assessing partisan change have missed an important piece of the puzzle. And this piece of the puzzle, when included in the analysis, shows that New Deal issues remain central to the public's partisan calculations-evidence that the nation's fifth party is not dead yet.
A CLOSER LOOK AT NEW DEAL ISSUES
The accuracy of the conclusions presented so far hinge, in large part, on my definition of New Deal issues. While this definition is reasonable, one could worry that its breadth may cover up important patterns of change in the public's attitudes. These underlying patterns might actually lend support to the notion of a shift in the partisan agenda. For instance, the electorate may be far less supportive of the Democrats' commitment to an activist federal government in the 1980s. Or perhaps the public no longer thinks of the Democrats as the party of the working class. Such changes would indicate a restructuring of public attitudes, but my definition of New Deal issues may be obscuring it.
To test for this concern, I have developed four subcategories of New Deal issues: short-term economic conditions, government programs and policies, group-related attitudes, and ideological references (see Appendix A for the exact coding scheme). These four categories should help sort out the possibility of differential change in the public's thinking about New Deal issues. By examining short-term economic issues, for instance, one can measure change in the public's partisan response to such matters as inflation, unemployment, and taxes. References to "government programs and policies," on the other hand, tap the public's response to classic New Deal policies like social security, welfare, job programs, and health care. Group-related concerns measure whether the public still views the Democrats as the party of the poor, the aged, the unemployed, the farmers, and the working class. Finally, ideological concerns will detect any shift in the public's attitudes toward such things as liberals, conservatives, states' rights, and government activism. These four groups, in sum, should provide additional insight into the patches of this New Deal quilt. Table 3 reports the importance of these issues to the public when describing what they like and dislike about the parties and candidates.'8 Whether one looks at salience or density, these four sets of issues have remained important to the public over the thirty-six-year time frame. The only statistically significant change over time arises for references about New Deal programs and policies. And in this particular case, the importance of these issues has actually increased. The salience in 1984 and 1988, for instance, has more than doubled since 1952. Thus, one of the core components of the New Deal has actually become more salient to the public in recent years-hardly evidence consistent with the argument that there has been a drift away from the political concerns of the New Deal.
The next question concerns possible changes in the partisan bias of these issues. Another point concerns the opposite trend in the salience of New Deal issues to the public. Recall that there has been a decline in the importance of New Deal issues for assessments of parties, but an increase in their importance for candidates. This pattern offers a number of interesting interpretations, some of which were addressed earlier. But one additional implication of potential significance is that these results indicate that a restructuring of the electorate's political thinking could be just around the corner. Since candidates are increasingly being judged by New Deal standards, the rhetoric of the nominees will probably have a big effect in determining the overall importance of these issues to the public. Candidates, therefore, may now be able to set the tone of the political debate for the electorate. If so, future presidential nominees could introduce a new set of issues, thereby recasting the political agenda of the American electorate. Of course, nominees like Mondale may appear in the future, breathing life into New Deal issues. But the point is that the relevance of New Deal issues to the public probably rests on a more fragile foundation than at any time since the 1950s, which could be a harbinger of significant change.
Although it is great fun to speculate about the future, the purpose of this paper has been to assess the public's discussion of New Deal issues over the last ten presidential elections. Given that objective, one conclusion is clear: The issues forged in the 1930s continue to be important to the electorate even fifty-five years after FDR launched the New Deal. There has been important change during the thirty-six years under study, but the durability of New Deal issues is remarkable. Moreover, the longevity of the Democratic edge on these matters is also surprising. Public opinion, in short, appears quite stubborn. Perhaps the Republicans will be able to build on their successes in the 1980s, allowing them to usher in a new set of issues that restructures the political debate. But, at this point, it appears that the New Deal will continue to be an integral part of the public's thinking well into the 1990s, suggesting that claims of a "realignment" are probably overstated and that at least parts of the nation's fifth party system remains intact.
APPENDIX A: CODING OF THE OPEN-ENDED COMMENTS
Below I list the actual codes that were treated as "New Deal" for the like/dislike questions on parties and candidates. I shall, however, present only the scheme for the 1984 survey. This year is representative of the other studies, providing the reader with a sense of the exact codes used. The other years are available upon request. One can also see Kelley (1983) (Key, 1955; Burnham, 1970; Clubb et al., 1980 ). An alternative conception stresses the coalitional underpinnings of the parties, holding that a new partisan arrangement arises when these coalitions undergo lasting change (Petrocik, 1981 (Petrocik, , 1987 Beck, 1982 To explore these potentially differential patterns of change, I examined how blacks, white southerners, members of union households, white northern Protestants, Catholics, and first-time voters responded to New Deal issues. In each case, New Deal issues remained salient to these different groups. There were, however, some significant changes in the partisan bias of these issues for a few groups. The white south, for instance, now views the GOP favorably on New Deal issues. Blacks, on the other hand, increased their support for the Democrats on New Deal issues. All in all, the data support the work of other scholars that there has been a restructuring of coalitions of the parties (see Petrocik, 1981 Petrocik, , 1987 Ladd and Hadley, 1978; Stanley, 1987; Black and Black, 1987; Axelrod, 1986; Stanley et al., 1986) . These data are available upon request. 18. I have not reported the attitudes of the public separately for parties and candidates. This decision stems, for the most part, from my earlier argument that a usefiul way to assess partisan change was to combine both sets of (questions. But an additional benefit of this decision is that the paper is kept within a manageable size. For those interested, the patterns are much like those found in Tables 1 and 2 . These separate analyses are available upon request.
